Despite a spate of recent events concerning lobbyists and other special interest groups and their alleged undue influence on elected officials 1 , the U.S. political system is viewed by many as a relatively fair and impartial form of government, especially when compared to other governments (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) ). However, in the US, firms that contribute money to politicians appear to enjoy more frequent and better-quality access to politicians (Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) , Langbein and Lotwis (1990) , Durden et al (1991) , Stratmann (1991 ), Stratmann (1995 ), but contributing firms and firms with other types of political connectedness do not appear to change the outcome of votes on issues critical to connected firms. For example, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) survey 36 studies on the political efficacy of interest group contributions to politicians and find that contributions have apparently relatively little effect on voting outcomes.
Corporate contributions may not help the donating firms on average to influence voting outcomes, but there is evidence that the funds raised by candidates help them win elections. Snyder (1990) documents a positive relationship between the amount of contributions coming from special interest groups and the probability of a legislator winning an election. 2 In addition, Grier and Munger (1991) , Romer and Snyder (1994) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) show that influential legislators (i.e., party leaders, committee chairs, and members of powerful committees) raise substantially more funds than other legislators. So, contributions appear to increase the welfare of the candidates, but are contributions associated with an increase in the welfare of the corporate contributors? In addition, if contributing firms benefit, does that imply that firm contributions cause the benefits, or is it simply that better firms contribute more?
In this paper, we address these important questions by studying shareholder wealth effects for firms that make contributions to political candidates. Our main focus is on the question of whether there exists a robust relationship between contributions and changes in contributors' shareholder wealth. We also present tests addressing the causality question, but view our results as preliminary and defer to future research for a more rigorous treatment. Using data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC), we create a new and comprehensive database of publicly traded firms' political action committee (PAC) contributions to political campaigns in the U.S. from 1979 to 2004. After merging the FEC contributions data with CRSP/Compustat data, we have approximately 800,000
contributions made by 1,633 firms over the past twenty five years or so -thus, we have a remarkably rich dataset to test for systematic contribution/return effects arising from publicly traded firms' involvement in the U.S. political process. Our sample captures over 70% of the total dollar volume of 1 Many examples of past and present political controversies can be found at The Center for Responsive Politics web page at http://www.crp.org/. 2 Stratmann (2005) provides a survey of the related literature.
all hard-money corporate contributions and represents on average 60% of the market-value-weighted capitalization of all publicly traded firms in the U.S.
We develop a simple measure to describe firms' political contribution practices that takes advantage of the comprehensive nature of the FEC data. We view each firm as supporting a portfolio of candidates and simply sum up, over a rolling multiyear window, the number of candidates that each firm supports. We find that the average firm participating in the political donation process contributes to 73 candidates over any five-year period, 53 of whom go on to win their elections.
There is substantial variability across firms in the number of supported candidates, with a standard deviation of approximately 96 candidates.
We perform panel regressions of returns on the lagged number of supported candidates and other control variables. We find that the number of supported candidates has a statistically significant positive relation with future abnormal returns for firms which contribute to political candidates. The relationship is evident in univariate regressions of abnormal returns on the number of supported candidates as well as in multivariate regressions after controlling for other established predictors of returns such as book-to-market (BM), firm capitalization (SIZE), and momentum, measured by lagged 12-month buy-and-hold returns (BHRET12).
To better understand the sources of the contribution effect, we examine variations on our basic measure of total supported candidates. These modified measures capture the total strength of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm (as measured by the length of the firmcandidate relationship), the ability of the candidates to help the firm (as measured by the home state of the firm and the candidate), and the power of the candidates (as measured by a candidate's committee ranking). We find that our results are robust to these alternative contribution definitions.
We document especially strong effects for a measure related to the ability of the candidate to help the donating firm. Thus, the contribution effect appears to increase for firms that have longer relationships with candidates, support more home candidates, and support more powerful candidates.
We further break the contributions data up into House and Senate categories. We find that there is an incremental House effect after controlling for the Senate effect, although contributions to both branches of government result in positive economic effects for the contributing firms. Our finding of an incremental effect for firms supporting House candidates may be related to the constitutional provision that revenue and appropriations bills must originate in the House. Thus, firms may find that it is more expedient to support House members, where potential firm welfare increasing actions may be more suitably created. We also split our sample along political party lines. The FEC data show that Republican candidates typically receive higher total dollar contributions than do Democrats and that Republican candidates' contributions come from a larger number of supporting firms than do Democrat candidates' contributions.
However, despite the fact that Republicans receive more contributions than Democrats, we find an incremental contribution effect for Democrats after controlling for Republican effect, but do not find an incremental Republican effect after controlling for the Democrat effect.
We also create annually rebalanced political index-weighted portfolios. We find that the portfolios earn abnormal returns. For example, a portfolio of firms weighted by the number of supported candidates has a statistically significant Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model abnormal monthly return of 21 basis points (or about 2.4% per year). We perform further tests to evaluate the risk of the political contribution portfolios. First, we follow Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and examine the performance of the political contribution stocks in up and down market states. We find that political contribution portfolios earn greater returns in negative market states than in positive market states, suggesting that politically active firms may enjoy a greater level of "protection" in bad times, consistent with Gordon, Hafer, and Landra's (2007) theory that political giving may serve as a form of insurance. Second, we examine the covariation of the political portfolio's beta with the expected market risk premium in a conditional CAPM framework. We find that the political portfolios are not riskier in periods of high market risk premium, results inconsistent with a timevarying risk story.
Our paper is not the first to document wealth effects to firms from being connected to politicians; there is an important and growing literature on the welfare benefits to firms which exhibit a degree of connectedness to politicians. These studies examine connectedness arising from 1) explicit relationships between firms and politicians (e.g., the politician is a member of the firm's board of directors) and 2) a firm's contributions of money to a politician's coffers.
Connectedness arising from explicit relationships appears to be important for firm welfare. Faccio (2006) examines stock price reactions to the announcement of two potentially connectedness increasing events; one, that a firm's officer or a large shareholder enters politics and two, that a politician joins a firm's board. She documents an over 2% increase in firm value at the announcement that an officer or large shareholder enters politics. Faccio and Parsley (2006) document an approximate 2% decline in the market value of firms connected to legislators for a sample of 123 legislators who unexpectedly die. Fisman (2001) examines Indonesian firms that are connected to the Suharto family and shows that these companies decrease in value following announcements of declining health of President Suharto. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find that the likelihood of government bailouts of financially distressed firms increases for firms that have a top company officer or large shareholder in an important government position.
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Connectedness arising from firm contributions to politicians also appears to be important for firm welfare. Roberts (1990) Overall, the existing research on the value to the firm of political connections is intriguing; there appear to be positive shareholder wealth effects to being connected and the value of being connected is greater in more corrupt countries. In this paper, using our merged FEC/CRSP/Compustat data base, we are able to construct firm-specific year-by-year connectedness measures, allowing us to perform tests over the full sample, something which has not been possible with previous event-based measures of political connectedness. With this new dataset, we document a strong correlation between lagged contributions and future returns.
Is the documented correlation evidence of a causal link between firm PAC contributions and future stock prices? Answering this question in the affirmative requires resolution of potential endogeneity problems with our data. Later in the paper we offer anecdotal evidence that is consistent with causation: we discuss the growing body of literature that documents benefits to firms from being politically connected; we examine the link between contributions and returns around exogenous shocks to contributions (changes in the allocations of House Representatives to states based on US Census counts); and we perform instrumental variables tests using two instruments for our contribution variables (the number of House Representatives in the firm's state and the number of firm employees). The results of these tests are indicative of a causal link between contributions and future returns, but do not conclusively prove the link. Our hope is that future work, perhaps using this paper's new contributions database along with legislation and other information, can better determine whether our results arise from 1) better (higher return) firms making more contributions or 2) firms that make more contributions earn greater returns and this arises A) in part from elected officials maximizing general public welfare or B) it suggests an unfair exchange of dollars for policy, resulting in wealth transfers from those firms without access to those firms with access, or subsidies from taxpayers to contributing firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe the data used in our analysis and detail the construction of the firm political contribution measures. In Section II we present results which document the effects of political contributions on future returns. In Section III we explore the sources of the contribution effect. Section IV concludes.
I. Data Sources and Variable Construction

A. Contribution data
Our data on corporate contributions is from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) detailed committee and candidate summary contribution files for the period 1979 -2004. 4 We merge the FEC data with CRSP/Compustat data and build a comprehensive database of firm contributions, monthly returns, and annual firm accounting characteristics from 1984 to 2005. We first describe the FEC data, detail the construction of contribution variables designed to capture return effects, and then describe the full merged FEC/CRSP/Compustat dataset.
We obtain FEC data on total campaign financing raised by each candidate's (re)election campaign. The contribution data are all "hard-money" contributions meaning that they are made to specific candidates and the contributions are limited to $10,000 per candidate per election cycle ($5,000 contributed during a primary election and $5,000 contributed during a general election). 5 See
Appendix A for details on the limits of contributions and other aspects of campaign finance law. The FEC database identifies seven distinct groups that contribute to candidates' campaigns: (i) individuals, (ii) labor organizations, (iii) corporations, (iv) trade, membership, and health organizations, (v) party committees, (vi) non-party committees, and (vii) corporations without capital stock. We obtain data on total funds received by each candidate from each of these groups. The FEC detailed committee contribution file consists of 2,794,790 contributions made by all special interest 4 The summary file provides data on how much total money each candidate received from different interest groups, what the total cost of the election was, and other related information. The detailed file provides contribution-by-contribution data for each candidate. It records all contributions in excess of $200 made by all special interest groups (corporations for our purposes), the date of the contribution, and the amount. 5 This is in contrast to "soft-money" contributions which are non-candidate specific contributions from individuals and special interest groups used on voter registration expenses, "get out the vote" campaigns, "party building," issue advertising, and other administrative expenses. 
B. Contribution Indexes
We use the FEC data to create measures that describe firms' relationships with political candidates. We construct our initial measure based upon implications from the above results that not all firms participate in the contribution process, the average contribution per candidate is about the 8 It is unlikely that firms contribute below contribution limits because they receive little money from individuals allowed to contribute to their PACs. Ansolabehere et al (2003) report that corporate PACs can double the amount they contribute to political candidates by legally shifting their overhead expenses to the sponsoring firms. Instead, corporate PACs choose to pay for overhead and other administrative expenses from the funds raised from corporate officers and employees. same regardless of how many candidates a firm supports, the participating firms are very large, and the FEC contribution limits are on average not binding. Those findings are consistent with the idea that to establish a meaningful link with a politician, it may require more than simply donating $10,000 in hard-money contributions to a candidate -that is, it may require soft money-like contributions, or other forms of non-money favors, which are not publicly disclosed, and which only larger firms can afford.
9 Thus, a potential way to summarize firm contribution practices is to keep track of the total number of candidates that a firm supports. As long as hard money contributions are correlated with other ways in which firms establish relationships with politicians (there is evidence that they are correlated; see Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) and Bombardini and Trebbi (2008) ), then the number of politicians that a firm supports with hard money contributions is a good proxy for the degree of firm involvement in the political process.
Thus, our initial measure is simply the sum of supported candidates (House, Senate, and Presidential) over a rolling multiyear window. At the end of October of each year, we compute the total number of supported candidates over the previous five years for each firm in our sample. The five year window would seem to be a reasonable length of time to capture potential candidate/firm relationships. For example, Snyder (1992) We create variations on our basic measure of number of supported candidates. These robustness measures are designed to scale equation 1 with other important contribution dimensions related to the strength of the relationship between a candidate and the contributing firm, the ability of 9 Anecdotal examples of firms helping politicians include: The New York Times (see McIntire (2006) ) reports that large insurance companies in New York State skirted around legal contribution limits to candidates by routing contributions through dozens of obscure subsidiaries; The Salt Lake Tribune (see Ivins (2006) Concerning the strength of the relationship, Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) show that to maximize contributions, legislators tend to build relationships over time with PACs by participating on specialized committees and catering to PACs' interests. Snyder (1992) presents evidence that long-term PAC/candidate relationships are valuable for many PACs. Stratmann (1998) documents that highly reputable politicians are more likely to receive contributions prior to critical votes, while less reputable politicians are more likely to receive contributions after critical votes. Thus, politicians that have strong relationships with special interest groups (and therefore are considered more trustworthy) are valued (and rewarded) differently by special interest groups than other politicians.
Regarding the ability of the politician to help the contributing firm, Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) suggest that politicians may cater to their constituents and exert greater bureaucratic effort on initiatives that benefit the local constituency. Consistent with this argument, Roberts (1990) finds a significant negative stock price reaction at the announcement of Senator Jackson's death for firms operating in his district. In addition, Faccio and Parsley (2006) find important economic effects for firms linked to local politicians. These findings suggest that firms adjust their contributions to politicians as the expected ability of these politicians to help the firm changes. Finally, pertaining to the power of the candidate, Grier and Munger (1991), Romer and Snyder (1994) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) document that elected officials who are committee chairs or who serve on powerful committees raise substantially more money than other members.
Thus, using the aforementioned papers as a guide, we construct three political indexes designed to capture strength, ability, and power features of the firm/candidate relationship. We construct the strength of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm as follows.
Each candidate supported by a firm and currently in office as of October of year t, gets assigned an indicator variable of one. We then multiply the indicator variable by the number of months that the firm has maintained an uninterrupted relationship with the candidate. We consider uninterrupted relationships as those relationships in which the firm did not miss any past reelection cycles of the candidate. We then scale that number by the ratio of total House or Senate votes the candidate's party has relative to the total votes of the opposing party (for either the House or the Senate) with the idea that the firm/candidate relationship grows stronger (weaker) for candidates from the controlling (opposing) party. Thus, the PI strength measure for firm i in year t is: where Cand jt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has contributed money to candidate j over the years t-5 and t, I jt is an indicator variable equal to one if candidate j is in office at time t and zero otherwise, NCV jt is the number of votes that candidate j's party holds in office at time t, NOV jt is the number of votes that candidate j's opposing party holds in office at time t, and rellength jt is the number of months that firm i has maintained an uninterrupted relationship with candidate j until time t. The ratio jt jt NOV NCV captures the candidate's party strength relative to the opposition party.
The second variation is designed to capture the ability of the candidates to help a firm. In this measure, we only include candidates that hold office in the same state in which the firm is headquartered. We obtain firm headquarter data from Compustat. The PI ability measure for firm i in year t is: 
where HomeCandidate jt,t-5 is an indicator variable if candidate j is running for office from the state where firm i is headquartered and zero otherwise, and the rest of the variables are as defined above.
The last variation is designed to measure the power of the candidates. In this measure, we weight the candidate by the sum of the candidate's committee rankings. The PI power measure for firm i in year t is: 
where Committee rank mt is the reciprocal of candidate j's rank on committee m (where rank =1 for the most important member, rank = 2, for the next important, and so on), Median committee rank mt is the median number of members on a given committee m for which candidate j's is a member, and the rest of the variables are as defined above. we use market value scaled accounting ratios, such as book-to-market (BM) and firm capitalization (SIZE). To construct the ratios, we use accounting information from fiscal year end t-1 from
Compustat and capitalization from December of year t-1. For firm capitalization alone, we use the market value of the firm's equity from CRSP at the end of June of year t. When our tests include lagged return measures (for example, twelve-month lagged returns) we estimate a monthly updated annual buy-and-hold return over the previous 12 months, skipping the return in month t-1 (to avoid microstructure related biases). In keeping with the convention in most cross-sectional asset pricing papers, BM and SIZE are updated annually, at the end of June each year. Political indexes are updated annually, at the end of October each year.
In Table III we report formation period (that is, for the year prior to and including October of year t) summary statistics for various firm characteristics of contributing and non-contributing firms.
We report the time-series average of yearly cross-sectional median values and the average of yearly cross-sectional averages for capitalization (SIZE). The non-contributing firms are all firms in CRSP/Compustat that meet the above sample formation screens but do not appear on the FEC database. Appendix B provides exact formulas for the non-political index variables used in our tests.
In Panel A, contributing firms are much larger than non-contributing firms; the time-series average of the yearly median capitalization of contributors is $1.6B versus $168M for the non-contributing firms (the time-series average of the yearly mean capitalization is $6.5B for contributors and $779M for non-contributors). In a typical year, our sample includes 697 contributing firms which constitute 9.5% of all publicly traded firms and represent 62.4% of the total market capitalization. We find that the average capitalization of contributing firms, computed relative to annually ranked NYSE breakpoints, places the contributing firms consistently in the top 13% of capitalization. Thus, firms participating in the political process are very large firms. Contributing firms on average have lower returns over the previous 36 months, higher book-to-market, lower cash flow, and higher leverage than do the non-contributors. The last observation is consistent with Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) who find that government bailed out politically-connected firms have significantly higher leverage ratios than their non-connected matching peers.
In Table III , panel B, we report characteristics of the contributing firms based on annual decile sorts of the number of supported candidates (equation 1) measure. Some interesting patterns emerge. First, the firms that support more candidates are much larger firms than the firms that support fewer candidates: The average capitalization of the firms in the top decile of number of supported candidates is $27.3B, decreasing almost monotonically to $1.3B for the firms in decile one of supported candidates. The top decile contribution firms have lower 36-month returns and are more profitable (as judged by PROFIT and ROE) than the firms in the lowest decile. In Table III Panel C, to better understand which types of firms participate in the political process, we examine the characteristics of firms with and without PACs within size-ranked deciles. We sort all firms by NYSE annually ranked decile breakpoints and within each decile report the characteristics of contributing and non-contributing firms. We find that the percentage of firms making contributions increases dramatically as we move from the smallest to the largest decile of annually ranked NYSE breakpoint capitalization (these numbers are not reported in the table); the percentage of firms making contributions is 2.4% for the smallest decile, 21.9% for decile five, and 68.5% for the largest decile.
In addition, contributors tend to have lower prior 36-month returns, higher book-to-market and leverage, and lower cash flow and profitability compared to similar size non-contributors. The above patterns are consistent with a simple story: if there are in fact extra costs (above and beyond the nominal costs of hard-money contributions) to participating effectively in the contribution process, then it appears that the high-contributing firms, with their much larger firm size may be more able to incur these expenses than the low-contributing firms. In addition, because of their recent poor stock price and earnings performance, PAC firms, relative to their non-contributing size matched peers, may have a greater incentive to establish political connections that can help increase firm performance.
II. Results
A. Panel Regressions
We perform panel (cross sectional time series) regressions of monthly abnormal stock returns on the lagged political contribution indexes and other firm characteristics. A firm's abnormal return is calculated as the difference in the stock's return in month t, minus the return to the characteristic matched portfolio in month t. 11 We seek to determine whether firms that support more candidates, have longer relationships with candidates, support more local candidates, and support more powerful candidates earn higher abnormal returns controlling for variables which have been shown to be important predictors of the cross-section (book-to-market equity (BM), capitalization (SIZE), and twelve-month lagged returns (BHRET12) - Fama and French (1992) , and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ). We take the natural log of all the right hand side variables except BHRET12. The contribution measures are standardized to have unit variance in order to facilitate comparisons across the indexes. Since each observation of the dependent variable is a monthly abnormal return and the independent variables are updated annually, the regression residuals will be correlated due to persistence in the independent variables. This results in biased standard errors if OLS or the FamaMacBeth procedure is used (Petersen (2008) ). To account for correlated residuals, we report firm clustered standard errors in all panel regressions in the paper.
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The abnormal return panel regression results are reported in Table IV . The results show that the total number of supported candidates ( ) is related to the cross-section of future abnormal returns for firms participating in the political process. Specifically, firms which support a greater number of candidates earn higher future returns; the t-statistic on the coefficient of the total number of supported candidates is 1.86 in the univariate regression (specification 1) and is 4.78 in the multiple regression (specification 5). The coefficients on ln(SIZE) and BHRET12 are of the usual sign.
) ln(
candidates it PI 13 The coefficient on book-to-market is consistently negative in specifications 5 -8. 14 11 We follow the methodology outlined in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) to calculate benchmark-adjusted returns. We form 125 benchmark portfolios that capture the three stock characteristics of book-to-market equity, size and momentum. We form the benchmark portfolios as follows. At the end of October of year t, the universe of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq common stocks are sorted into five portfolios based on each firm's capitalization in June of year t using June NYSE quintile breakpoints. Firms in each size quintile portfolio are further sorted into quintiles based on their book-to-market ratios from the end of year t-1. Finally, the firms in each of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios are further sorted into quintiles based on their prior twelve-month holding period returns estimated through the end of May of year t. Thus we generate 125 benchmark portfolios. We calculate value-weighted monthly returns on each benchmark portfolio from November of year t through October of year t+1. The benchmark portfolios are rebalanced yearly, at the end of October. Each of the contributing firms is assigned to a benchmark portfolio according to its rank on size, book-to-market, and lagged one-year return as of the end of October of year t. 12 We re-estimate all regressions in the paper using a Fama-MacBeth procedure where standard errors are adjusted for first order autocorrelation in the estimated slope. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. 13 Firm size is positively correlated with the number of supported candidates (the correlation is 34.9%), which may result in a multicollinearity-induced bias in the point estimates on size and the number of supported candidates in specification 5. We estimate a univariate model with only the number of supported candidates measure and report the results in specification 1. We also estimate a univariate model with SIZE only and find a negative coefficient (t-statistic = -2.29). Finally, we estimate bivariate models with SIZE and each political index and find a consistently negative coefficient on size and a positive coefficient on the political indexes (t-The regressions in specifications 2 through 4 (univariate models) and 6 through 8 (multiple regression models) examine the robustness of our basic total-candidates measure to the other three political indexes. As might be expected because of their multiplicative construction, the other contribution indexes (equations 2 through 4) are highly correlated with the total candidates measure (correlations range from 0.51 to 0.97). Thus, we estimate monthly return regressions using each political index in a separate regression to rule out bias in the index coefficients from the high degree of correlation across the indexes. The coefficients on the three alternative measures, strength of the relationship (specification 6), ability of the candidate (specification 7), and power of the candidate (specification 8) all obtain statistically significant positive t-statistics (4.36, 4.29, and 4.65, respectively).
The coefficient on the number of supported candidates provides us with a sense of the economic effects of contributions. A one standard deviation increase in the number of supported candidates is associated with about a 14 basis point per month (1.69% per year) higher abnormal return. We find similar results with the other contribution measures; a one standard deviation increase for the strength, ability, and power measures are associated with higher monthly average abnormal returns of between 12 to 14 basis points. These results suggest, for example, that a firm that supports an additional seven home-state candidates earns an extra 1.45% in abnormal returns. For comparison, in specification 5 of Table IV, a one standard deviation increase in ln(BM), ln(SIZE), and 12-month lagged returns predicts a -6, -17, and 23 basis points per month change in abnormal returns, respectively.
A.2 Party, Chamber and Party-Control Effects
Next, we split our sample along political party lines and along House and Senate chambers.
The FEC data show that Republican candidates typically receive higher total dollar contributions than do Democrats and that Republican candidates' contributions come from a larger number of supporting firms than do Democrat candidates' contributions, so one might hypothesize that the contribution effect should be greater for firms contributing to Republican candidates. 15 In addition, there are constitutional provisions which state that all revenue raising legislation and appropriations bills must originate in the House. Thus, firms may find that it is more expedient to support House statistics on the political indexes range from 3.63 for the strength of the relationship index to 4.06 for the ability index), suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in our sample. 14 We get a negative coefficient on book-to-market because we use abnormal returns in these regressions. If we use excess returns (i.e. returns in excess of the risk-free rate) instead, the coefficient on book-to-market is positive. 15 We find that the average firm supports 39% Democrat candidates and 61% Republican candidates over any five-year period. for the strength of the relationship index up to 5.51 for the ability index for the January -December convention. Also, our results are unchanged using BM and size updated in October of year t. We examine variations to the lagged returns variable used in our regressions: we replace monthly updated lagged 12 month returns with 6, 12 or 36-month annually updated returns and monthly updated 6 or 36-month returns and find that the significance of the PI coefficients are robust.
To explore whether our documented hard-money-based contribution effects are driven by non-candidate specific soft money contributions, we estimate regressions of the four political indexes from 2003 to 2005, a period over which soft-money contributions from corporations were banned. If 16 We also estimate regressions in which we interact candidate party and chamber affiliation with the control/non-control indexes. These regressions do not suggest a control/non-control effect in returns.
soft-money contributions are a significant source of the contributions effect, we would expect to see less of an effect after 2002. We find that the coefficients on the four indexes are actually larger in the post 2002 period than in the previous periods (but as expected, due to the short time series, are less statistically significant), consistent with the observations that 1) the contribution effect in stock returns prior to 2002 was not due solely to non-candidate specific soft-money contributions, and 2) that the contribution effect remains strong in the most recent years of our sample.
We control for charitable giving. High amounts of charitable giving may signal that a firm's managers have private information concerning positive future performance (Margolis, Elfenbain, Walsh (2007) and Navarro (1988) ). However, large charitable contributions may also signal an agency problem in which a manager is simply engaged in wasteful spending (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Wang and Coffey (1992) for Generous giving, which equals to one if a firm has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing threeyear net earnings before taxes to charity and zero otherwise. KLD updates the data annually at the end of the calendar year. We merge the charitable giving variable from year end t-1 with firm monthly returns from November of year t to October of year t+1. We re-estimate the panel regressions in Table IV using lagged charity, the political contribution index, and the other control variables (book-to-market equity (BM), capitalization (SIZE), and twelve-month lagged returns (BHRET12)) as explanatory variables. Despite the fact that we now have a shorter sample (starting in 1991) and a reduced number of firms, we find that charity does not subsume the political indexes: the t-statistics on charity are statistically significant and the t-statistics on the coefficients of the political indexes remain significant (t-statistics range from 2.03 for the strength of the relationship index to 3.02 for the power index).
We control for firm age. Newly listed firms are smaller and may have extra cash on hand from their initial public offerings, and so may be less likely to participate in the political process, at least initially, which may result in less of a political contribution effect for these firms. 17 We reestimate our panel regressions of Table IV by including firm age as an independent variable. The coefficient on age is negative and significant, and the significance of the political indexes is relatively unchanged: the t-statistics on the coefficients of the four PIs range from 4.59 for the ability index to 5.25 for the number of supported candidates index.
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Finally, we test for the presence of the contribution effect in firms' operating performance (ROE) and firm value (market-to-book). The results of these tests are consistent with our return tests;
we find in general positive and significant loadings on the political contribution indexes.
B. Political Contribution Portfolios
In this section, we create political index weighted portfolios. We form the portfolios by weighting each firm by its relative value of a given political contribution index. Thus, firms that have a larger value of a given political index are given a larger weight in a portfolio. The portfolios are rebalanced once a year, at the end of October. The weight given to stock i in the portfolio from November of year t to October of year t+1 is:
where p equals the portfolio for a particular political index (equations 1 through 4), and is the political index value for firm i (where i= 1, 2,… N) in October of year t. After forming the portfolios, we obtain a time series of monthly returns to each portfolio from November of 1984 to October of 2005. We regress the time series of portfolio returns in excess of the risk free rate on the excess VW market returns, the three-factor model (MKT, SMB, and HML) and the Fama-French-Carhart fourfactor model (MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD) and report the intercepts in Table VI .
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We find that the political contribution portfolios earn positive abnormal returns and that the evidence of abnormal returns is robust to the four political indexes. Across the four PI-weighted portfolios, the CAPM alphas range from 39 to 48 bps, the three-factor alphas range from 7 to 11 bps, and the four-factor alphas range from 18 to 22 bps. The CAPM and four-factor alphas are all statistically significant, but the three-factor alphas, while exhibiting positive intercepts, are not statistically significant (t-statistics range from 0.93 to 1.44). The PI portfolios have market betas close to one, low loadings on SMB (betas range from -0.05 to 0.11), moderate to high loadings on HML (from 0.51 to 0.63), and negative loadings on UMD (from -0.10 to -0.12). Using the loadings from Table I of Fama and French (1996) as a benchmark, the politically active firms match up closely to large cap firms with a tilt towards value, consistent with our results in Table III that politically active firms are larger firms with slightly greater BM ratios. In addition, the negative loadings on UMD suggest that the firms in our sample are experiencing return reversals, potentially arising from their involvement in the political process. Overall, the factor models are not able to explain the returns to politically active firms.
We perform further tests to evaluate the risk of the political contribution portfolios. First, we follow Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and examine the performance of the political contribution stocks in up and down market states. If political stocks are more risky than non-political stocks, we should see that the political contribution stocks perform relatively worse in down market periods. In contrast, if stocks with political connections garner some degree of an insurance effect from their involvement with politicians, then one might expect them to perform better relative to noncontributors in down market periods. We form a long minus short portfolio composed of a valueweighted portfolio of all firms with PACs minus a value-weighted portfolio of all non-PAC firms.
This portfolio earns an unconditional return of 10 basis points, but more importantly, earns 90 basis points per month when the VW excess market return is less than zero, and -38 basis points when the market return is greater than or equal to zero (the difference is statistically significant, with a tstatistic = 3.7). This result suggests that politically active firms may enjoy a greater level of "protection" in down market states, consistent with Gordon, Hafer, and Landra's (2007) theory that political giving may serve as a form of insurance.
Second, we follow Petkova and Zhang (2005) , Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and others and examine the covariation of the political portfolio's beta with the expected market risk premium in a conditional CAPM framework. We create an expected market risk premium using a standard set of four business cycle variables (i.e., the default premium, the term premium, the dividend yield, and the short-term Treasury bill rate). We regress the VW market excess monthly returns on the four business cycle variables and then multiply the resulting parameter estimates by monthly realizations of the business cycle variables to generate an expected monthly market risk premium. Next, we estimate a conditional beta for the spread portfolio (composed of a value-weighted portfolios of all firms with PACs minus a value-weighted portfolio of all non-PAC firms) using the four business cycle variables. We regress the monthly portfolio returns on the monthly return of the market scaled by the business cycle variables. The resulting parameter estimates from the regression are multiplied by monthly realizations of the conditioning variables to generate a monthly conditional beta. Finally, we estimate a "beta-premium sensitivity" for the spread portfolio by regressing the time series of the conditional beta on the monthly expected market risk premium. If the time-series variation in the political contribution portfolio is consistent with a conditional CAPM risk-based story, then we would expect a positive and significant beta premium sensitivity (i.e., the portfolio's beta should be higher in more risky states of the world). We find the beta-premium sensitivity is -1.42 (t-statistic = -1.98), suggesting that the political contribution based portfolio is actually less risky in times of high marginal utility of consumption. Thus, these tests do not suggest that politically active firms are riskier firms.
C. Endogeneity
Our evidence on the positive association between corporate political contributions and stock returns appears to be robust and is, at least to us, thought provoking. Because firms do not decide to participate in the political process randomly, our results are not necessarily generated by a causal relationship. It is equally likely that contributing firms are simply better firms, a fact that is reflected in their stock price performance. To establish a causal relationship from contributions to returns, we would have to rule out the alternative explanation. We attempt to tackle this difficult task in this section. Our results should be viewed as merely suggestive, however, since rigorous treatment of this problem is outside the scope of this paper. Our intent is to provide some preliminary evidence in the hope that future research will help to resolve this issue.
We begin by pointing to a growing body of literature that looks for a source of firm value from political connections. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) document that companies connected to a winning party are more likely to obtain procurement contracts. Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk (1999) document that influential government contractors (those with the largest dollar volume of contracts) are penalized much less severely when they commit fraud in an attempt to deceive the government. Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) report that Brazilian firms making political contributions to elected federal deputies earn higher stock returns and substantially increase their bank financing relative to a control group after elections, suggesting that access to bank capital is an important source of value. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) document that politically connected firms are much more likely to get bailed out in bankruptcy. While this evidence is consistent with political connections serving as a source of value, it is not necessarily inconsistent with politically connected firms being better firms. Thus, we are cautious about overinterpreting these results and simply view these aforementioned papers as plausible economic explanations supporting a causal effect between contributions and returns.
C.1. A natural experiment
If an exogenous shock takes place that changes the contribution behavior of firms but is not correlated with changes in future returns, then it is possible to use that shock to identify possible causal linkages between contributions and returns. We search for such a shock and identify changes in allocations of House representatives to states based on Census counts of US population.
Representatives in the House are allocated to states proportionally as a function of state population, so states that experience a large increase (decrease) in state population are allocated more (fewer) representatives. Firms making political contributions should respond to these allocation changes by changing their contribution practices (the number of local candidates that they support, for example), which, in turn, should affect firm returns, if there is a causal link between contributions and returns.
We have two Censuses during our sample period, 1990 and 2000, so we study changes in contribution effects from two years before to two years after each Census for all firms headquartered in states that experienced a reallocation of representatives.
We find a marginally significant increase (decrease) in the contribution effect for state- A caveat to our methodology is that it still could be the case that firm performance and population changes are endogenous. Deterioration in state economic conditions affects firm performance and people's decision to migrate out of the state to other places with better economic conditions. The resulting population changes affect the distribution of politicians across states and, therefore, firms' contribution practices. While this explanation is plausible, we think it is less likely.
First, Korniotis and Kumar (2008) document that deterioration in state economic conditions is associated with higher future state-specific returns. Under the reverse causality explanation above (i.e. returns cause contributions), we would expect to find lower returns following deterioration in state economic conditions. Second, when we regress value-weighted state returns against percentage changes in population, we do not find a statistically significant relationship (t-statistic = 0.61). Taken together, this suggests that the reverse causality is unlikely to be an issue here.
C.2. Instrumental variables
We use an instrumental variables approach in an attempt to deal with endogeneity issues A proper implementation of instrumental variable approach requires identifying a valid instrument. For an instrument to be valid, it should be both relevant (the variation in the instrument should be related to the variation in the endogenous right hand side variable in the main regression) and exogenous (the part of the right hand side variable captured by the instrument has to be exogenous). 19 As an attempt to come up with an instrument that satisfies these two conditions, we propose two alternative instruments for our PI variables: (i) the number of House Representatives in the firm's state and (ii) the number of firm employees. A higher number of state candidates gives greater opportunity to firms to participate in the political process especially when it comes to contributing to local politicians. A higher number of firm employees increases the amount of capital at firm PAC's disposal since PACs receive money from firm employees and individuals directly affiliated with the firm. Although we cannot rule it out completely, there is little economic reason to suspect a priori that both of these instruments are systematically related to abnormal firm returns. 20 To check the validity of the proposed instruments we perform the following formal tests on instrument relevance and exogeneity. We first regress each PI measure on a proposed instrument and use the F-statistic from this regression to test the relevance of the instrument. An F-value less than 10 indicates that the instrument is weak (not relevant) resulting in a biased estimate in the second stage (Stock and Watson, 2003 This has a Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom with 5% (10%) critical value of 3.84 (2.71). The J-statistics from our regressions are 0.54 for the number of supported candidates, 1.30 for the strength of the relationship index, 0.30 for the ability index, and 0.96 for the power. Thus, the Jstatistics fail to reject the null hypothesis that both instruments are exogenous (i.e., the instruments are not correlated with the error term in our main regression). Having already established the relevance of the instruments with high F-values in the first stage, these tests confirm the validity of both of the instruments. Table VII . For both instruments, the predicted political indexes are reliable predictors of the cross-section; the t-statistics on the coefficients range from 2.77 to 5.03 providing support for our previous finding of a positive association between the political indexes and future abnormal returns. Overall, the results of these tests suggest that after controlling for simultaneous causality bias, firm political contributions appear to lead to future abnormal returns.
IV. Conclusions
Ansolabehere , de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) argue that political contributions should not be viewed as investment in the political process but merely as a form of consumption good. Their argument is built around the apparent paradox of campaign financing -if political contributions serve as investment in the political process, the rate of return earned on that investment appears astronomically high (Tullock (1972 (Tullock ( , 1980 ). If we assume that the value of the hard-money contributions we use in this paper is the true total cost for firms participating in the political process, then our results also suggest an extremely high rate of return for firms participating in the political contribution process. 22 Of course, another story is that the true costs for firms to participate in the 21 If both instruments are exogenous, then their coefficients will be close to each other once they are used in the same regression. If the parameter estimates for these instruments are significantly different from each other, then either one or both of the instruments is not exogenous. The test of overidentifying restriction makes this comparison using the F-statistics to test whether the coefficients of the instruments are jointly equal to zero. See pages 353-354 in Stock and Watson (2003) for the details of this test. 22 In our sample, firms invest an average total contribution amount per year of $23,471 and earn an average increase in shareholder wealth of $163.8M per year (i.e., the average annual increase in four-factor model abnormal shareholder wealth is 21 basis points x 12 months x average firm capitalization of $6.5B = $163.8M.
political process are greater than the costs of hard-money contributions, and potentially include other off-the-books contributions or non-money favors, for which only large firms can afford to pay. Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) show that large PAC contributors spend 20 to 60 times more on lobbying expenses than they do on hard money contributions. Similarly, Bombardini and Trebbi (2008) cycle. Based on this data, corporations spend roughly 77 times more on lobbying than they do on campaign contributions ($2.59 billion / $33.8 million). 23 Alternatively, it is possible that politicians find it most beneficial to grant favors to large firms because those are the firms that generate the largest amount of tax revenues and jobs. For example, Bertrand et al (2004) find that firms managed by connected CEOs in France create more jobs in more politically contested areas, and that this is especially the case around election years.
In this paper, we capture the effectiveness of firm participation in the political process with a unique portfolio approach of how many candidates a firm supports. Using this measure, we document a strong correlation between the number of candidates that a firm supports and the firm's future abnormal returns. We also attempt to address potential causality problems (i.e., do returns cause contributions or do contributions cause returns); we consider a natural experiment and an instrumental variables approach and show that the positive correlation between the number of candidates that a firm supports and the firm's future abnormal returns is consistent with firm political participation causing future abnormal returns. Thus, our results are consistent with the idea that firms may participate in the political system not from the standpoint of consuming a patriotic consumption good, as suggested in Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) , but rather from the standpoint of creating positive net present value investments.
Appendix A: Campaign Finance Law This appendix provides a brief historical overview of campaign finance laws in the United States. While these laws are rather extensive, we focus primarily on provisions dealing with disclosure requirements and contribution and spending limits by candidates and political parties.
A.1. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
As early as 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt, recognizing the need for regulating the financing of federal election campaigns, called for a ban on corporate contributions for political purposes. As a result, the U.S. Congress has passed several statutes between 1907 and 1971 that collectively were designed to limit the disproportionate influence of wealthy individuals and special interest groups on the outcome of federal elections. For example, in the Act of August 19, 1911, Congress banned all corporate contributions to political parties and imposed disclosure requirements on political contributions and expenditures. Over the next half-century, the ban was extended to other organizations including labor unions and trade associations. However, these rules were not comprehensive enough and were rarely strictly enforced (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) ).
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), passed by Congress in 1971, was the first comprehensive set of rules governing public funding of federal elections. It also provided for a detailed set of disclosure requirements for candidates and political parties. Congress amended the Act in 1974 following the Watergate scandal setting strict limits on contributions by individuals, political parties and special interest groups. The 1974 amendment also created an independent agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), to enforce the campaign finance law.
According to FECA, candidates seeking a federal office may create their own candidate campaign committees. National parties may create party committees. Both types of committees must be registered with the FEC and report to the FEC all contributions in excess of $200 made to them by individuals and special interest groups. Special interest groups may include corporations, labor unions, trade organizations and other interest groups.
For the purposes of transparency, special interest groups must create (and register with the FEC) their own political action committees (PACs) and make contributions to national parties or candidates only through these committees. The sponsoring interest groups are not allowed to contribute to their own PACs but may cover PACs' start-up, administrative and fundraising expenses. PACs may solicit contributions only from individuals associated with the sponsoring organization. In the case of corporate PACs, only individuals directly employed by the firm may contribute to the firm's PAC, with most of contributions coming from the firm's top managers.
FECA established strict limits on contributions by individuals and special interest groups (which include corporations) to candidates, party committees and PACs. For each two-year election cycle, PACs have been allowed to contribute up to $10,000 to a candidate per election ($5,000 contributed during a primary election and $5,000 contributed during a general election). Individuals have been allowed to contribute up to $2,000 to a candidate ($1,000 during a primary and $1,000 during a general election), up to $5,000 to any special interest PAC and up to $20,000 to a party committee. Finally, FECA imposed a $25,000 limit on the total amount of political contributions made by individuals. No limit was set on the total number of candidates which special interest PACs may support.
Despite the existing contribution limits, individuals and special interest groups could contribute unlimited amounts during elections by using two important exceptions. First, individuals and interest groups were allowed to spend unlimited amounts in "independent expenditures" in support of or against political candidates. To qualify as "independent expenditures", these expenditures could not be coordinated with candidate or party campaigns. Second, individuals and interest groups could contribute unlimited amounts to political parties in "soft-money" contributions. These contributions, established under the 1979 amendment to FECA, were intended to be used on voter registration expenses and on "get out the vote" campaigns. Quickly, however, the parties began to use soft money for party building and other administrative expenses. Perhaps more controversially, political parties began using soft money on issue advertising, which amounted to supporting or criticizing particular candidates running for office.
A.2. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
By many accounts, FECA has not been very successful in limiting the role of wealthy individuals and special interest groups in the election outcomes. The use of "independent expenditures" and soft money by the wealthy has allowed them to advance their agenda in federal elections. In early 2002, in part influenced by the spectacular collapse of Enron (a major political contributor in federal elections), Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which significantly altered the campaign finance system in the US.
Two of the most important changes introduced by the Act are the ban on all soft money contributions and the increase in contribution limits. The limit on contributions from individuals directly to political candidates was doubled from $2,000 per election cycle to $4,000 per election cycle. The individual contribution limit to party committees was increased from $20,000 to $25,000 per election cycle, and the contribution limit to state or local PACs was increased from $5,000 to $10,000 (there was no change in the individual contribution limit to other special interest PACs). Finally, the limit on total individual contributions was increased from $25,000 to $95,000 per election cycle. Contribution limits from special interest PACs to candidates and political parties were not changed.
The BCRA also limited the use of independent expenditures for issue advertising. Under the new issue advertising restrictions, special interest groups cannot pay for any advertisement that identifies a federal candidate within 30 days of a primary election or within 60 days of a general election. Any advertisement that does identify a federal candidate within those time periods must be paid for with regulated "hard-money" contributions or with contributions coming directly from individuals.
Appendix B
The variables used in the paper are listed below (with Compustat data items in parenthesis).
Market value (SIZE) is the price per share times shares outstanding at the end of June of calendar year t.
Book-to-market equity (BM), for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t, is as defined in Davis, Fama, and French (2000) where book equity (BE) is the stockholders book equity (data60), plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (data35), minus book value of preferred stock (in the following order: data56 or data10 or data130) and ME is the price times shares outstanding at the end of December of calendar year t.
ASSETS is total assets (data6)
ROE is income before extraordinary items (data18) scaled by total common equity (data60) Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, scaled by total assets Tobin's Q market value in fiscal year t measured as price times number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t (data199*data25) divided by book equity (BE) in fiscal year t.
EMPLOYEES is the number of employees in millions (data 29)
PROFIT is operating income before depreciation scaled by lagged total assets (data13/data6) The sample of contributing firms is from the FEC detailed files for the period 1979 -2004. We exclude all non-corporate contributions, contributions from private firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms, as well as contributions from firms for which there is insufficient data on CRSP/Compustat. The final merged sample includes 799,786 contributions made by 1,633 unique firms. Monthly returns from November 1984 to October 2005 are merged with the total number of supported candidates from October of year t and accounting variables from June of year t. ASSETS is Compustat data item6, total assets, in millions of $, from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1. Capitalization (SIZE), in millions of $, is calculated using the price and the number of shares outstanding at the end of June of year t. EMP is the number of employees in millions (data 29). All accounting variables (book-to-market ratio (BM), Leverage, return on equity (ROE), cash flow (CF), profitability (PROFIT) are calculated using Compustat data in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1. BHRET36 is the 36-month buy and hold return over July(t-3) to June(t). BHRET12 is the 12-month buy and hold returns over July (t-1) to June (t). The numbers in each cell are time series averages of yearly cross-sectional medians, with the exception of average capitalization (SIZE-AVG), in millions of $, which is the time series average of yearly cross-sectional mean capitalization. Number of firms is the average number of firms per year for the non-contributors and contributors. Number of supported candidates is the average number of supported candidates per firm over a 5 rolling year window (see equation 1 in the text). Panel A reports characteristics of non-contributing and contributing firms. Panel B reports characteristics of the contributing firms based on annual decile sorts of the number of supported candidates (equation 1) measure. Panel C reports characteristics of non-contributing firms (top number) and contributing firms (middle number) as well as the t-test for the difference between non-contributing and contributing firms (bottom number). All numbers, with the exception of ASSETS, SIZE, and SIZE-AVG, are in decimal form, e.g. 0.01 is 1 percent. Details on the construction of these variables are provided in the appendix. The sample of contributing firms is from the FEC detailed files for the period 1979 -2004. We exclude all non-corporate contributions, contributions from private firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms, as well as contributions from firms for which there is insufficient data on CRSP/Compustat. The sample includes 799,786 contributions made by 1,663 unique firms. Our sample includes 693 firms at the beginning of the sample period and 720 firms at the end of the sample period. These contributions are combined into four separate political indexes (PIs) according to equations 1 -4 in the text.
candidates is the number of supported candidates, strength is the strength of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm, ability is the ability of the candidates to help the firm, and is the power of the candidates. Monthly abnormal returns from November 1984 to October 2005 are regressed on the natural logarithm of each lagged political index and the natural logarithm of lagged book-to-market ratio (ln(BM)), the natural logarithm of the lagged firm's market value of equity (ln(SIZE)), and lagged 12-month buy-and-hold returns (BHRET12). Ln(BM) and ln(SIZE) are computed as of June of each year and updated in July. BHRET12 is computed every month over the period t-13 to t-2. Political indexes are computed as of October of each year and are updated in November. Abnormal returns computed are as the difference between sample firm raw returns and the value-weighted return for the book-tomarket, size, and momentum matched portfolio of firms. The t-statistics are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. The sample of contributing firms is from the FEC detailed files for the period 1979 -2004. We exclude all non-corporate contributions, contributions from private firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms, as well as contributions from firms for which there is insufficient data on CRSP/Compustat. The sample includes 799,786 contributions made by 1,663 unique firms. These contributions are combined into four separate Democrat (Republican) political indexes (PIs) by modifying equations 1 -4 with an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate is affiliated with the Democratic (Republican) Party and zero otherwise. Similarly, contributions are combined into separate House (Senate) PIs by modifying equation 1 -4 with an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate is affiliated with the House (Senate) and zero otherwise. Monthly abnormal returns from November 1984 to October 2005 are regressed on the natural logarithm of each lagged political index and the natural logarithm of lagged book-to-market ratio (ln(BM)), the natural logarithm of the lagged firm's market value of equity (ln(SIZE)), and lagged 12-month buy-and-hold returns (BHRET12 The sample of contributing firms is from the FEC detailed files for the period 1979 -2004. We exclude all noncorporate contributions, contributions from private firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms, as well as contributions from firms for which there is insufficient data on CRSP/Compustat. sample includes 799,786 contributions made by 1,663 unique firms. These contributions are combined into four separate political indexes (PIs) according to equations 1 -4 in table II and the text. We form portfolios of contributing firms by weighting each firm by its relative value of a given lagged political contribution index. The portfolios are rebalanced once a year, at the end of October. The weight given to stock i in the portfolio from November of year t to October of year t+1 is: where p equals the portfolio for a particular political index (equations 1 -4 in table II and the text), and is the political index value for firm i (where i= 1, 2,… N) in October of year t. We form a time series of monthly returns to each portfolio from November 1984 to October 2005. We regress the time series of portfolio returns in excess of the risk free rate on the market risk premium, on the three factors from the Fama-French model, and on the four factors from the Fama-French-Carhart model and report the intercept (i.e., the alpha) for each portfolio. Returns are in decimal form, i.e., 0.01 is one percent. T-statistics are in parentheses. The sample of contributing firms is from the FEC detailed files for the period 1979 -2004. We exclude all non-corporate contributions, contributions from private firms and subsidiaries of foreign firms, as well as contributions from firms for which there is insufficient data on CRSP/Compustat. The sample includes 799,786 contributions made by 1,663 unique firms. These contributions are combined into four separate political indexes (PIs) according to equations 1 -4 in the text.
candidates is the number of supported candidates, strength is the strength of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm, ability is the ability of the candidates to help the firm, and power is the power of the candidates. The table presents the results for the instrumental variables estimation. In the first stage, each PI is regressed on the number of House Representatives in the firm's state (Panel A) , on the natural logarithm of the number of firm employees (Panel B) , and the natural logarithm of lagged book-to-market ratio (ln(BM)), the natural logarithm of the lagged firm's market value of equity (ln(SIZE)), and lagged 12-month buy-andhold returns (BHRET12). We compute the predicted PI from the first stage. In the second stage, monthly abnormal returns from November 1984 to October 2005 are regressed on the natural logarithm of each predicted lagged PI and the natural logarithm of lagged book-to-market ratio (ln(BM)), the natural logarithm of the lagged firm's market value of equity (ln(SIZE)), and lagged 12-month buy-and-hold returns (BHRET12). Ln(BM) and ln(SIZE) are computed as of June of each year and updated in July. BHRET12 is computed every month over the period t-13 to t-2. Political indexes are computed as of October of each year and are updated in November. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between sample firm raw returns and the value-weighted return for the book-to-market, size, and momentum matched portfolio of firms. The t-statistics are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. The F-statistic in the last column is from the first-stage regression and tests the null hypothesis that the parameter estimate from the univariate regression of PI on the instrument is zero. 
